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Abstract 
 This article examines union responses to the reorganization of call centre work in 
Germany, drawing on case studies from the telecommunications, financial services and 
subcontractor industries. Service unions initially adopted innovative strategies to organize these 
workplaces, response to threats and opportunities presented by the rapid growth of a new 
'sector*. However, the new conglomerate service union, ver.di, has been unable to sustain these 
alternative strategies due to both institutional and organizational factors. The increasingly 
fragmented character the German industrial relations system provides growing exit options for 
employers, while union is disadvantaged by declining membership, resource scarcity and an 
organizational structure reflecting past industry (and union) boundaries. Ver.di thus finds itself in 
an institutionally enhanced innovation dilemma. Sustaining innovations necessary to organize 
new workplaces would require organizational slack and redundant resources. However, 
environmental pressures of changing employer strategies and institutional erosion limit the 
possibilities for mobilizing these resources. 
 
Keywords: Call centres, financial services, Germany, industrial relations, institutional change, 
outsourcing, path dependency, telecommunications, trade unions 
  
INNOVATION DILEMMA    3 
   
   
 
Introduction 
 The diffusion of call centres embodies multiple challenges for unions internationally: the 
expansion of poorly organized service workplaces and atypical employment forms; the adoption 
of new outsourcing strategies by management; and the regimentation and standardization of front 
line work. These challenges are particularly pronounced in Germany. The country’s institutional 
legacy of strong unions, encompassing collective agreements and stakeholder-oriented corporate 
governance arrangements, were thought to encourage employers to invest in their workforce and 
cooperate with unions (Hall and Soskice, 2001). However, in recent years bargaining coverage 
and union density have declined and the traditionally strong nexus between works councils and 
unions has weakened (Streeck, 2009). Under these conditions, collective bargaining institutions 
no longer set minimum standards that apply to wider sectors of the economy (Voswinkel and 
Lücking, 1996), but become part of a fragmented landscape of piecemeal rules. 
 Research findings to date paint a mixed picture of German unions’ ability to respond to 
these developments. A number of studies have portrayed them as myopically focused on core 
worker groups and slow to reach out to newer growing segments of the workforce. These 
scholars argue that the previous strengths of German unions may have turned into liabilities and 
learning blockades (Hassel, 2007; Visser, 2007) as their recognized institutional position reduces 
the need and motivation to adopt new organizing approaches (Baccaro et al., 2003). Other 
research suggests that unions are experimenting with innovative strategies, but with uneven 
success (Greer, 2008; Vandaele and Leschke, 2010). Disagreement turns on the extent and nature 
of obstacles to innovation and the changes that would be needed to overcome those obstacles. 
Under what conditions do unions that have enjoyed a strongly institutionalized position adopt 
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new approaches to organizing and representing workers? What factors contribute to the success 
or failure of these strategies? 
 This article examines union responses to the growth of call centres in Germany since the 
late 1990s, with the aim of analysing the challenges associated with organizing this new sector 
and institutionalizing new approaches to regulating these jobs. The frequently standardized and 
regimented working conditions in call centre establishments and their obvious position outside of 
traditional industry boundaries encouraged German service unions to adopt innovative 
organizing initiatives that involved a unique level of cross-union cooperation. However, union 
representatives found it difficult to sustain these new approaches, and they were largely 
abandoned following the merger that formed the conglomerate service union Vereinte 
Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft (ver.di). The key puzzle is why this abandonment occurred, given 
the persistence of the conditions that encouraged these innovations – namely, the growing 
difficulty of regulating employment in networked workplaces through traditional coordinated 
bargaining strategies in core firms. 
 Case studies in the telecommunications, banking and call centre subcontractor industries 
show that both institutional and organizational factors influenced unions’ ability to develop 
successful responses to changing employer strategies. On the institutional side, the German 
industrial relations system has undergone considerable fragmentation in recent years, which has 
undermined collective actors’ power bases while enhancing employers’ ability to segment labour 
markets. However, as organizations, unions face choices concerning how to respond to these 
changes in their environment. This article argues that ver.di’s failure to institutionalize the 
innovations needed to move beyond established patterns of action is explained by the structure 
and distribution of available resources. Findings suggest that following a brief window of 
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opportunity, or ‘critical juncture’, union officials came to perceive new strategies targeting call 
centre workers as unworkable and exceedingly costly under the constraints imposed both by the 
shifting environment and new departmental boundaries within ver.di.  
 The following sections discuss the literature on path dependency and institutional change, 
with specific reference to its application to recent changes in German collective bargaining and 
union strategies. The article then examines the different strategic approaches unions have 
developed towards organizing and representing call centre workers and the challenges they have 
faced in accomplishing their goals of normalizing these jobs. 
Path-dependency and strategic action 
 Theories of path dependency have gained prominence in debates on both institutional and 
organizational change in recent years. Institutions and organizational routines can constrain and 
enable the capacity for action, leading actors to adhere to established modes of organizing. They 
regulate this capacity, shape expectations and influence the range of strategies available to 
actors, both cognitively and normatively. The literature on societal effects (Maurice and Sorge, 
2000) and studies within the varieties of capitalism literature (Hall and Soskice, 2001) assume 
along similar lines that institutions encourage actors to select strategies in line with their 
environment, and that these strategies, in turn, reproduce existing institutions. 
 These arguments suggest that organizations are largely constrained by their environment 
and the legacy of past modes of behaviour. Their path dependency may amount to a lock-in to 
strategies that become increasingly inefficient over time if mechanisms of self-enforcing 
feedback develop (Sydow et al., 2009). However, organizations also both react to and bring 
about changes in their environments, as they seek to reduce resource dependence and advance 
organizational goals (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Management strategy theorists have pointed 
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out that organizations often avoid or defect from institutions (Oliver, 1991) or try to increase 
their own strategic options through ‘nibbling away’ at the framework of rules and regulations 
(Friedberg, 1995: 145). Comparative scholars have argued that institutional change can result 
from the more or less unintended consequences of organizational actors’ incremental actions 
(Djelic and Quack, 2003), leading to erosion, dwindling of resources and losses of cohesion. 
These strategic and incremental changes are interrelated: if institutional configurations lose 
coherence they may increase the spaces and the rewards for strategic manoeuvring (Streeck and 
Thelen, 2005), and actors who become more opportunistic will decrease their long-term 
investment, interest and trust in institutional stability. 
 Organizational theories are often applied to firms, which are expected to seek competitive 
advantage through modifying both existing institutions and their own strategies when they are no 
longer advantageous (Fligstein, 1996). However, changing company strategies often have 
substantial effects on the constraints and possibilities for action experienced by other actors, 
including labour unions. Worker representatives in established firms and industries face a 
particular set of challenges as firms restructure employment and re-draw organizational 
boundaries. These strategies can have cumulative effects on bargaining coverage and union 
power, through increasing employers’ options to exit collective agreements and established 
procedures of negotiation (Doellgast and Greer, 2007). Thus, the continued effectiveness of 
unions’ past approaches to regulating employment is influenced by interrelated changes in 
formal institutions, such as labour laws and bargaining rights; and changes in employers’ own 
structures and strategies (Sako and Jackson, 2006).  
 Unions respond to such developments in their institutional and political environment in 
different ways. They may seek to widen their perception of constituencies and issues, explore 
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organizing strategies and learn from other players in the field (Katz et al., 2003; MacKenzie, 
2000). Alternatively, they may reiterate attempts to root their policies in past sources of power, 
such as traditional constituencies and established rights, rules and modes of distribution, 
supported by strong identities or inherited traditions (Frege and Kelly, 2003; Hyman, 2001). An 
important question is why unions choose to go down a particular one of these strategic paths: 
under what conditions are unions able to break out of established patterns of action, and what 
factors explain the success or failure of these strategies? 
Changing union strategies in Germany 
 Germany is a particularly good national case for investigating changing union strategies 
in the face of broader environmental challenges. The German industrial relations system has long 
been characterized by strong traditions of social partnership, supported by extensive 
codetermination rights and union bargaining power. Interest representation at the company level 
can be secured by elected works councils that negotiate agreements on a range of issues, such as 
performance appraisal and work organization and by worker membership on company advisory 
boards. Collective bargaining on pay and working time typically takes place at the industry (and 
regional) level, between industry-based unions – most of which are affiliated with the 
Confederation of German Unions, the Deutscher Gewerkschaffsbund (DGB) – and a large 
number of employer associations with non-mandatory membership. 
 The formal laws and bargaining structures underpinning this system have remained 
relatively stable, but their coverage has eroded dramatically in recent years. While German 
reunification first led to an increase in unionization, soon afterwards membership and influence 
declined, with considerable representation gaps in the eastern states (Visser, 2007). Collective 
agreements increasingly contain ‘opening clauses’ that allow local worker representatives to 
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exchange wage and working time concessions for job guarantees. At the same time, a growing 
number of employers are exiting employer associations or moving business to other sectors, and 
works councils cover a shrinking proportion of the workforce (Addison et al., 2010). The 
voluntary nature of the German industrial relations system has exacerbated these trends. Unlike 
most other European countries, Germany lacks both a general minimum wage and effective 
mechanisms to extend collective agreements to more poorly organized firms and workplaces. In 
this context, traditional strategies have had limited success in stemming the loss of members and 
the rapid growth of low wage and poorly regulated jobs (Bosch and Weinkopf, 2008; Royle, 
2004). 
 Comparative scholars have argued that not only do German unions face large structural 
and institutional challenges, but they have also been slower to innovate in response to these 
challenges compared with their counterparts in other countries. According to some researchers, 
German unions’ previously strong position has locked them into a reliance on traditional, 
institutionalized sources of bargaining power, at the expense of organizing new sectors and 
groups of workers (Baccaro et al., 2003; Hassel, 2007). Others find some adjustment to and 
expansion of the range of strategies. Greer (2008) demonstrates that local unions have 
successfully organized public campaigns opposing hospital privatization; Turner (2009) 
documents recent examples of innovative campaigns that applied Anglo-Saxon organizing 
techniques (see also Gajewska and Niesyto, 2009); and Vandaele and Leschke (2010) discuss 
efforts by several unions to organize non-standard workers. However, these studies conclude that 
the campaigns they describe are exceptional.  
 This conclusion suggests that while German unions are innovating, they have had varied 
success, at best, in moving beyond traditional corporatist bargaining arrangements to expand 
INNOVATION DILEMMA    9 
   
   
 
their power and influence. The present study is distinctive in examining why unions have had 
such difficulty institutionalizing new approaches to organizing and representing workers, 
through the lens of a series of campaigns targeting call centre workplaces. 
The research 
 This article explores the development of German service sector unions’ strategic 
responses to the diffusion of call centres from the 1990s onwards. It is based on three related 
research projects that were carried out between 2000 and 2006 – two studies of call centres in 
Germany conducted in 2000-2002 and 2004-6 (by Holtgrewe) and a comparative study of 
telecommunications and outsourced call centres conducted in 2004-5 (by Doellgast). Together, 
these studies involved over 200 open-ended interviews with call centre managers, works 
councillors and employees at 21 case study companies (encompassing 27 call centres); as well as 
union and employer association representatives at both the national and regional level. Follow-up 
interviews were conducted with key stakeholders between 2006 and 2010 to update 
developments in major union campaigns and organizing efforts. 
 Previous publications from these projects focused on developments in the 
telecommunications industry (Doellgast, 2008, 2009) or on work organization and employment 
structures (Holtgrewe, 2007; Holtgrewe and Kerst, 2002). The current analysis examines service 
unions’ changing approaches to regulating call centre work over time. We draw on five case 
studies from the banking, telecommunications and subcontracting sectors to illustrate the 
challenges posed by shifts in employer strategies, and use findings from the remainder of our 
case studies and stakeholder interviews to describe industry trends and union strategies. 
 This diachronic perspective gives a unique window on both the possibilities for unions to 
engage in innovative action in the face of new challenges and the factors that can inhibit or 
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reverse this innovation. The unions that now make up the conglomerate service union ver.di 
experimented with a range of strategies to organize new call centre workplaces and represent call 
centre workers. However, ver.di’s capacity to develop and maintain these new approaches was 
hampered by the structural constraints of a growing low-wage sector, cost-driven competition 
within and between sectors, the relative lack and frequent turnover of social partners on the 
employer side and the structure and distribution of resources within the union.  
 In the following sections, the interplay of employer and union strategy development is 
investigated in the banking, telecommunications and subcontractor industries. Then the impact of 
the merger of five service unions to form ver.di and the development of networked initiatives 
within the new union are discussed. 
Employer strategies and union responses 
 In Germany, call centres expanded rapidly in the mid- to late 1990s, as managers took 
advantage of new information and communication technologies to reorganize and rationalize 
service and sales work. The telecommunications and banking industries were at the forefront of 
these trends. National and EU legislation in the 1990s contributed to the liberalization of both 
industries, lowering barriers to market entry, increasing the role of international firms and 
changing the conditions for incumbent players. Telecommunications firms especially acted as 
both lead users and providers of services for the reorganization of service delivery. 
 The German banking industry has traditionally had high collective bargaining coverage 
due to strong industry-level collective agreements, but low union membership density and a 
weak tradition of coordinated bargaining between unions and works councils. It is also an 
industry in which the DGB’s service sector unions – led by Handel, Banken, und Versicherungen 
(HBV) – faced some competition from independent unions or associations of salaried workers. 
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Telecommunications long represented a contrasting case, in which the Deutsche 
Postgewerkschaft (DPG) negotiated a single-firm collective agreement with the monopolist 
Deutsche Telekom and enjoyed strong bargaining power due to protected markets, high union 
density and close relationships with the company’s works councils (Darbishire, 1997). 
 In the mid- to late 1990s, unions in both industries faced new challenges. In banking, the 
liberalization and internationalization of financial markets resulted in dramatic changes in the 
size, ownership structure and strategic focus of major employers. In telecommunications, 
Deutsche Telekom was privatized and formerly protected markets were gradually opened to full 
competition by the late 1990s. These changes in markets encouraged firms to adopt new 
organizational strategies aimed at reducing costs and rationalizing service provision. Large banks 
began to establish independent direct banks and banking call centres from the mid-1990s outside 
collective agreements, allowing them to set wage rates below negotiated levels (Arzbächer et al., 
2002; Matuschek et al., 2007; Sørensen and Weinkopf, 2009). Deutsche Telekom initially 
outsourced lower skilled jobs or calls during ‘unsocial working times’ to third-party call centres 
with weaker or no union representation, keeping its core work in-house. However, by the late 
2000s it had adopted a similar strategy of establishing subsidiaries outside of its core agreements 
and then renegotiating pay and working conditions in separate company-level agreements 
(Doellgast, 2008). 
 The major unions sought to influence these decisions and their effects on the workforce 
through collective bargaining and some localized new organizing initiatives. They were 
supported by considerable public attention on the poor working conditions in this new ‘sector’, 
which was frequently perceived as emblematic of the flexibility and regimentation in the new, 
IT-intensive world of work (D’Alessio and Oberbeck, 2002). In addition, works councils 
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continued to apply their participation rights to regulate working conditions in subsidiaries and 
subcontractors. As the case studies below demonstrate, these efforts had limited success in the 
face of declining bargaining coverage and union power.1 
Banking: continuity and heterogeneity 
 In the banking industry, unions, works councillors and employee activists in new ‘direct 
banking’ subsidiaries had to actively struggle to establish the continuity of existing bargaining 
arrangements or to make new starts in interest representation. By 2010, unions had only 
succeeded in negotiating a collective agreement with one direct bank, leaving most of these 
workplaces regulated primarily by works council agreements. Three cases illustrate the different 
ways in which worker representatives responded to these changes, from cooperation to open 
conflict. 
 In Bank l’s call centre subsidiary, the transition of interest representation was organic: a 
works council was elected and recognized without opposition and continued to work closely and 
consensually with management. The call centre’s general manager stated that ‘our works council 
knows we’re running a call centre’, suggesting that the characteristics of flexible service work 
required a looser interpretation of bargaining rights laid out in German law. While the works 
councillors were union members, otherwise union density was ‘close to zero’ in the subsidiary 
and works councillors did not regard organizing as a priority. 
 Bank 2’s call centre was also established as part of a new direct banking subsidiary. 
Employees decided to establish a works council after several months, as they came under 
increased pressure to meet targets and increase their performance metrics. The initiators talked to 
several unions and then chose HBV. ‘For the union, [the situation] was like a bank teller in a 
                                                          
1 ‘Bank l’ and ‘Bank 2’ are anonymized case studies; real names are used for the other cases. 
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branch office who suddenly has this little old lady with a million marks’ savings in front of him’ 
(works councillor). However, management was not happy with the idea and, after some delaying 
tactics, set up an alternative list of candidates. Even the union-sponsored list was not exclusively 
made up of union members, due to the weak relationship between the union and the works 
council. After the works council was established, negotiations proved extremely difficult due to 
ongoing management blockades and infighting within the mixed works council. Finally, the 
management list’s three members stepped down, under the misconception that this would 
suspend the entire works council. Instead, the union filled the position with alternates from their 
list. Works councillors described the following period as an ongoing process of ‘educating’ 
management. However, this was interrupted when key managers left the centre – a frequent 
experience in call centres: 
After our old management had learned by and by where they needed to involve us, now 
we’re back to saying, okay, this is a restructuring process, so here and there we must be 
involved. And they don’t get that. (Works councillor) 
 The third case, Citibank, involved a transition from an internal focus on bargaining to a 
broader networked campaign in which the works council sought to build coalitions with unions 
and community groups to influence restructuring (Holtgrewe, 2001). Citibank had three call 
centre locations in Germany with very diverse works councils. In Bochum, the works council 
took a particularly ambitious and radical stand, styling themselves as the vanguard of global 
communication and service labour (Oberlindober, 2001) in an Italian autonomist-inspired way 
(Lazzarato, 1998). Still, they succeeded in making pragmatic gains, negotiating pay increases, 
increases in paid vacation and leave for students during exam time. 
 These efforts were interrupted when Citibank decided to consolidate its call centre 
operations in Duisburg under a new subsidiary, leading to a strike in November 1998 and the 
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dismissal of the strike activists. The banking union HBV provided only half-hearted support, 
although local (rather than national) union representatives started a support network involving 
local left-wing and church groups who called for a boycott of Citibank. Despite these 
innovations, the campaign had limited public effect and the jobs were moved to the subsidiary as 
planned. Some of the activists invested their severance pay into a new company, Tekomedia, 
which offers call centre, consultancy and training services, with a focus on occupational health – 
effectively providing outsourced and innovative services to unions. Other activists were hired by 
the new service union ver.di to work on a new organizing initiative, which is described in more 
detail below. 
Telecommunications and call centre subcontractors: competition beyond sectors 
 In the telecommunications industry, restructuring of call centre jobs in the major 
incumbent firm, Deutsche Telekom (DT), occurred over a longer time period and involved a 
more drawn out series of negotiated concessions with the union. DT initially outsourced 
directory enquiries to the call centre service provider Walter Services in the late 1990s. The 
union and works councils agreed at the time to support outsourcing in exchange for an extension 
of job security provisions. Then in March 2004, DT established a new call centre subsidiary, 
Vivento Customer Services (VCS), to handle its own call centre work and that of external 
clients. Between 2006 and 2008, DT sold several VCS call centres to Walter Services and 
Arvato, another subcontractor with no collective agreement, and transferred around 1800 
employees to the two companies. Employees moved to Arvato had the terms of their existing 
collective agreement secured through 2009, after which time managers asked employees to sign 
individual contracts at a lower pay rate. In 2007, DT shifted its remaining call centre jobs into a 
new subsidiary (T-Service) and demanded that ver.di renegotiate pay and working conditions. 
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Ver.di led a six-week strike with strong member support, but eventually agreed to take over 
reductions and increased working time, with a 30 per cent cut for new employees and increased 
variable pay, in exchange for an extension of protection against compulsory layoffs and a 
commitment to not sell the new service subsidiaries until 2010. 
 Meanwhile, the union had extended its activities to Walter Services, beginning in the late 
1990s. This company was targeted because it was one of the largest call centre subcontractors in 
Germany, set to overtake call centre services from DT and the public sector, and had a poor 
reputation for operating at the limits of German labour law through employing freelancers. DT’s 
union, the DPG, helped to organize works council elections at Walter, and then its successor 
ver.di negotiated a firm-level collective agreement, which was the first in the German 
subcontractor industry. New employee working time accounts were developed, which provided a 
framework for equalizing employees’ working time over the year. However, the collective 
agreement primarily formalized the terms of agreements previously negotiated by Walter’s 
works councils (Holst, 2008), which had already succeeded in changing the company’s policy of 
employing primarily freelancers. 
 While employment was thus successfully normalized to some extent, both the union and 
works councils found themselves negotiating in a deregulated and severely market-driven 
environment. For example, in areas of management policy where works councils enjoy formal 
codetermination rights, like performance-based pay or performance monitoring, management 
refused to compromise, arguing successfully that maintaining client contracts (and thus jobs) 
required substantial flexibility in both areas. Works councillors reported that they occasionally 
suspended their powers of codetermination over issues of monitoring in return for negotiations 
over other issues that were deemed more practical. Only in July 2009, after months of 
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negotiation and some strike action (Warnstreiks) a collective agreement on wages was concluded 
with base pay starting at €7.50. This represented a considerably lower pay rate compared to that 
in Deutsche Telekom’s in-house call centres and directly and negatively affected the working 
conditions of the employees transferred to Walter Services after its purchase of former Vivento 
locations. 
The ver.di merger: new projects across boundaries 
 In 2000, five service unions with roots in both the public and the private sector merged to 
form the new conglomerate union ver.di. As these unions sought to establish a basis for 
cooperation, they began to focus on new types of workers and work organization. They adopted 
joint strategies for organizing call centres that involved innovative campaign tactics and 
encouraged the establishment of joint projects across traditional union boundaries – mirroring the 
more networked, cross-industry nature of these workplaces. Resources were devoted to projects 
addressing ‘new’ constituencies for the union such as media freelancers, IT employees and call 
centre workers. The union started a cross-industry project, ‘Projekt Multimediabüro’, which 
hoped to transfer the experience of DPG in regulating telephone work at Deutsche Telekom and 
previously, the national Post Office, to other industries (Müller, 2001). 
 Efforts to develop higher employment standards and formal qualifications for call centre 
employees were undertaken at the regional level, in federal states or cities with large 
concentrations of call centres, and involved joint work with industry associations and economic 
development organizations. The German union confederation, DGB, led a campaign in the 
federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen (NRW) to link regional development subsidies to call 
centres’ ability to meet a certain criteria for job quality and union recognition. In a break with the 
state’s corporatist history, the unions were not originally involved in the government’s 
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‘Callcenteroffensive’, which was part of a policy initiative to attract new media companies to the 
region. Unions subsequently struggled to establish a voice and role in the initiative. Several 
unions, including the DPG and HBV, cooperated in drafting a set of criteria for pay and working 
conditions that could be used as a ‘quality seal’ (Mola and Zimmermann, 2001), which they 
argued could then be used in marketing efforts by both local economic development agencies 
and employers. However, the campaign was discontinued due to lack of support from member 
unions as well as ongoing resistance from the development agencies to working publicly with 
union representatives. In a similar way, union representatives participated in a regional call 
centre network in the East German state of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern in the late 1990s, which 
sought to develop a set of policies that would support both job quality and competitiveness. 
However, union representatives were marginalized and eventually withdrew from the network. 
 After ver.di was formed, the union continued to try to work with local and state 
governments and employers associations to promote more joint work on developing shared 
employment standards. The lack of a significant union presence in call centres did not help the 
union’s claims that it should be involved. Indeed, the union had begun to learn that its legitimate 
participation in regional development policies was no longer a matter of course when the focus 
was on ‘new economy’ sectors (Holst, 2008). 
 The SoCa project (Social Design of Work in Call- and Service Centres) is the longest 
running such initiative in which ver.di has been involved. Unlike the efforts described above, this 
started at the regional level in Bremen and then expanded to the national level. It was partly 
funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research, following a long tradition of public 
funding for research on job design in Germany. SoCa conducted surveys of call centre 
employees on the quality of their work and developed a ‘social benchmarking’ tool that could be 
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used by employers and unions to evaluate job quality in call centres (Endl et al., 2006). Similar 
to the other regional projects, however, the goals were rather vague and adoption of the tool by 
employers was limited. 
 These initiatives gave unions the opportunity to learn about the particular employment 
problems faced by call centre workers and the challenges of working with employers in the 
growing subcontractor industry. However, they failed in their stated goals of establishing core 
employment and qualification standards in call centres or legitimizing union involvement in 
setting these standards. Such social benchmarking strategies tend to assume already what they 
aim to accomplish: that employers are committed to the ‘high road’ of service quality and 
interested in creating good jobs to attract highly qualified employees. Case study and survey data 
have shown that this is often not the case in call centres, which typically operate under strong 
cost-cutting pressures (Holtgrewe, 2006; Taylor et al., 2002). Most problematically, none of the 
union’s efforts to get involved in regional initiatives and more or less formal standard-setting 
succeeded in extending collective agreements or increasing union membership. 
 A second set of projects focused on organizing works councils in new firms and 
industries through providing them with networking opportunities and services. These were 
targeted at building bargaining power through increasing union membership and improving the 
quality of works council agreements. Soon after the merger, the new banking department 
launched a campaign called ‘Fidi.direkt’ to establish a network of works councillors and activists 
in financial services, to negotiate collective agreements and to increase ver.di membership in 
banking subsidiaries through providing visible, organized services in particular cities or regions 
where the union already had a presence and member base. However, the relationship between 
these aims was not clear and the initiative did not move beyond workshops and networking 
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groups at the regional level, which focused on issues such as improving health and safety and 
offering training to works councillors. Success in raising membership or improving relations 
with works councils was minimal. The more confrontational approach favoured by former 
Citibank activists working on the initiative exacerbated communication problems between the 
union and works councillors in other banks, who often preferred more individualistic and 
company-oriented bargaining approaches. Fidi.direkt was discontinued at the conclusion of its 
contract in 2002, based on the perception that the gains from the project did not justify the cost. 
 Departments within ver.di have also worked together on a number of smaller projects in 
cities where call centres are concentrated, but these have, again, proven short-lived. In Hamburg, 
several ver.di departments set up a working group that brought together works councils from call 
centres in different industries for regular networking meetings. The project developed a 
catalogue of Betriebsvereinbarungen, the ‘works agreements’ that works councils negotiate with 
management, which was then distributed to all members. However, at the conclusion of the 
project, funding was cut and the network continued to meet only on an informal basis.  
 In another initiative in Hamburg, the two ver.di departments representing the retail and 
call centre subcontractor industries sought to jointly establish a call centre specific agreement for 
retail and mail-ordering call centres in Hamburg. An agreement was eventually negotiated with 
the large German retail firm Otto, but it included comprehensive opening clauses that allowed 
works councils to sign agreements with less favourable terms. Although several other firms 
adopted the agreed compensation structure (although at lower pay rates), they did not bind 
themselves as co-signatories. While the aim of establishing a collective agreement was reached, 
critics argued that the union had colluded in weakening existing agreements by shifting 
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negotiations onto the company level, allowing Otto to avoid the stronger provisions of the retail 
industry agreement. 
Unionists’ and work councillors’ views 
 Ver.di’s employees and consultants voiced similar criticisms of the union’s strategies. 
New initiatives rarely left the piloting stage. Consultants would frequently be brought in to 
coordinate a research project or networking initiative, but the union would not commit the 
resources needed to build institutional capacity beyond the project. It became obvious that each 
step of establishing works councils from new and non-traditional constituencies, building 
relationships with them, organizing them and their colleagues, developing networks with other 
actors in the field and negotiating collective agreements required more time and effort than 
expected, while yielding smaller gains and forming less of a logical sequence than necessary for 
a pilot project. Thus, the information gathered and relationships built with works councils were 
not used strategically to negotiate more encompassing collective agreements or to build 
bargaining power within firms. During the ‘boom phase’ of call centre growth in the late 1990s, 
these new workplaces received a lot of attention in the media and were the target of local 
economic development efforts. Local unions moved on to other issues as growth slowed and 
public interest waned, and as union representatives reviewed the rather unimpressive record of 
these initiatives. 
 Ver.di’s separate department structure made joint initiatives across industries particularly 
difficult to sustain. The union mirrored the division of industries of its founding unions, dividing 
its activities into 13 departments, or Fachbereiche, that included separate banking and 
telecommunications departments. Independent call centres were assigned to department 13, 
which was responsible for ‘special services’ ranging from the tourism and leisure industries to 
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facility management and security, temp agencies and consulting. Within ver.di, resources were 
allocated according to the membership base in the respective industries. Due to a decreasing 
membership base, funding for cross-industry projects was severely limited. A ver.di 
representative acknowledged that these initiatives ‘succeeded in overcoming Fachbereich 
egoism’ while they existed. However, all of them were discontinued after their piloting phase 
due to a lack of measurable success in increasing membership in the short run. 
 Because budgets for each department were tied to member numbers, there was little 
incentive to invest in risky organizing efforts at the expense of existing strongholds. At the same 
time, companies increased their capabilities to move work between sectors and exploit variation 
in cost and regulation. They thus exposed ‘core workers’ to competition, leading to further 
variation in the terms of agreements for call centres across sectors. This, in turn, fuelled conflicts 
between ver.di departments representing these sectors. For example, representatives from 
ver.di’s ‘special services’ department (13) negotiated the considerably weaker agreement with 
Walter Services discussed above, after department 13 had taken over responsibility for call 
centre subcontractors from the telecommunications department. This was viewed as sanctioning 
the large gap in pay and working conditions between Deutsche Telekom and Walter - and, 
indeed, this gap was then used by Deutsche Telekom’s management to argue for lower 
negotiated pay levels at the new call centre subsidiary T-Service that it established in 2007. 
 A second criticism of these new initiatives was that they primarily focused on the 
regional level, in a highly mobile industry. Ver.di’s local offices allocated more resources to 
campaigns in urban regions that had a large concentration of call centres, hoping to reach a large 
number of actual or potential members. However, these local initiatives faced seemingly 
insurmountable challenges in building firm-level bargaining power, as subcontractors and other 
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firms without collective agreements were able to exploit regional differences in wages and 
costs— particularly those between East and West Germany. 
 Meanwhile, viewed from the perspective of works councillors in the new call centre 
‘industry’, the German industrial relations system served as a set of not quite fitting tools, which 
they were on the front line of trying to adapt to a new environment. This environment consisted 
of the multiple challenges of networked work organization, temporal flexibility, immediate 
market pressures and an occasionally hostile or simply inexperienced management. New works 
councillors often faced overwhelming demands, continuous challenges to previous agreements 
and a shift of entrepreneurial risk onto employees. They were undertaking creative action and 
considerable innovation on the company level, often out of necessity (Jackson, 2005). Works 
councils’ mode of agency was thus changing towards patterns of localized bricolage that 
represented collective action on shifting ground, in the face of company strategies of 
diversification and outsourcing. 
Conclusion 
 Ver.di’s initiatives to extend bargaining power in the new, highly flexible and mobile 
area of call centre work encountered a range of obstacles. In direct banking subsidiaries, works 
councils were established, but networking was unable to bridge works councillors’ and activists’ 
diverse strategies and visions. In telecommunications, outsourcing forced former union 
strongholds into concession bargaining, while in subcontracting, only minor inroads into 
collective bargaining could be made. Efforts to build new institutions across industries at the 
regional and national levels were short-lived and widely viewed as unsustainable. Attempts to 
develop standards for working conditions and to gain influence in regional development 
initiatives lacked an institutional environment of social partnership and shared commitment to a 
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high road of service quality. Despite the ongoing challenges posed by the increasingly networked 
character of call centres, ver.di primarily settled back into established patterns of firm and 
industry specific organizing. 
 The findings from this case study have implications for theories of path dependency as 
well as for current debates concerning union responses to institutional change. An overarching 
question is under what conditions organizations respond to changes in their environment by 
altering their established practices and frames of reference; or, alternatively, become locked in to 
established (if increasingly ineffective) patterns of action. This article argues that ver.di’s failure 
to develop and sustain successful strategies to organize call centre workplaces was due to the 
interplay of institutional and organizational factors. The union’s past sources of institutional 
leverage were undermined by national trends of declining bargaining coverage and union 
membership, as well as firm- level organizational restructuring measures that further weakened 
established bargaining arrangements. Union representatives recognized and sought to respond to 
these new threats. However, their long-term success proved limited due to resource scarcity and 
the constraints of established industry and union boundaries, which were reproduced in ver.di’s 
new structure. 
 The obstacles ver.di encountered to developing effective new strategies in the face of 
these challenges cannot be explained solely using theories of path dependency (Sydow et al., 
2009) or attributed narrowly to German unions’ myopic reliance on past institutionalized forms 
of bargaining power (Baccaro et al., 2003; Hassel, 2007). The ver.di merger provided a critical 
juncture when the organization (and activists at its periphery) generated a variety of new 
projects. Thus, the union’s return to established approaches with diminishing returns and eroding 
capacities for action was not due to a lack of innovative capability or to simple inertia. 
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 Instead, ver.di experienced what can be described as an institutionally enhanced 
innovation dilemma (Rammert, 1988). Organizational and social innovations could be generated, 
but sustaining innovation over time would have required organizational slack and some 
redundancy of resources (Crouch and Farrell, 2004). The pressures of changing markets and 
employer strategies, dwindling membership rates and the union’s own organizational strategies 
of ‘lean management’ all limited resource redundancy – thus blocking the implementation 
processes that would be needed to overcome these constraints.  
 This suggests that shifting patterns of innovation and path dependency are best explained 
using a multi-level approach, which incorporates the broader institutional and strategic context of 
action into the analysis of resources and routines internal to organizations. Ver.di faced large 
challenges in moving beyond established strategies due to the growing incompatibility between 
established industrial relations institutions, its own organizational structure and the changing 
structure of firms and industries. On the one hand, German labour law and existing bargaining 
structures provided substantive rights that supported the continuity of interest representation and 
union entry into new industries. On the other hand, company restructuring made it difficult for 
unions to effectively use these rights while overcoming increased competition, alienation and 
mistrust between different groups of workers. The German institutions of industrial relations 
assume organizations with circumscribed boundaries: works councils’ co-determination rights 
over work organization, working times, job design and remuneration schemes are located at the 
level of the Betrieb or establishment; while union-led negotiation over pay levels occurs at the 
industry level. In recent years, collective agreements have shifted some bargaining and 
implementation responsibilities to the company or establishment levels, while the organization of 
work is moving beyond these boundaries (Sydow, 1997). 
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 These developments were particularly pronounced in the call centre establishments 
studied here. Their ability to shift and outsource work in real time and to organize, benchmark 
and control it beyond company boundaries gave management and clients increased power to 
unilaterally set or renegotiate employment terms and conditions. In this context, the union 
merger that formed ver.di, which was originally intended to focus union power in a changing 
environment, ironically reiterated the constraints of organizing along industry boundaries. Ver.di 
thus to some extent held itself captive to past industry specific bargaining structures by mirroring 
them in its internal structure and mode of resource allocation based on membership numbers. 
 These developments may be described as a dilemmatic redistribution of the capacity for 
action between employers, works councils and the union. Management - exposed to volatile 
markets, increasing customer demands and cost-cutting competition due to its own choice of 
business model - experienced expanding options to move work to establishments within regions 
and under collective bargaining arrangements of its choosing. These strategies were legitimated 
by the self-evident pressures of the market. Meanwhile, unions and works councils were 
supported by institutional rights that did not ‘naturally’ fit with the call centre working 
environment. Thus, these rights were often adapted as tools and negotiating resources for other 
purposes, and successful agreements were constantly at risk from business transfers and 
relocation. ‘New’ works councillors lacked experience, knowledge and a continuous basis for 
negotiation due to the high levels of worker and management turnover in call centres. However, 
their support by the union was contingent on the limited resources available, the interest of local 
union secretaries and their ability to communicate with an unfamiliar clientele. 
 Surmounting this innovation dilemma is likely to require changes in the mode of resource 
allocation within ver.di and broader changes in the institutional environment – both of which 
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could provide the union with new resources and forms of bargaining leverage. Comparative 
studies of the call centre sector provide possible models from other European countries. 
Government intervention has ensured mandatory extension of collective agreements and 
minimum wages to subcontractors in France and the Netherlands, while unions have successfully 
led efforts to extend legal and negotiated protections to peripheral groups of call centre workers 
in Austria and Denmark (Lloyd et al., 2009; Pemicka, 2005; Shire et al., 2009; Sørensen and 
Weinkopf, 2009; Van Jaarsveld et al., 2009). These measures have raised minimum terms and 
conditions in call centres and reduced potential escape routes from existing institutional 
protections. Similar changes in Germany may be necessary in order to level the playing field on 
the employer side and expand the union’s space for strategic innovation. 
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